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Abstract 
This paper investigates the role of different types of regulation in shaping the impact of services trade 
reforms. We find that measures of economic governance impact on the magnitude of the net benefits 
of market opening, and that the moderating effects associated with the quality of horizontal (cross-
cutting) regulation may differ from that related to sector-specific regulation. For some services 
activities, market access liberalization can substitute for weak regulation/governance. For others there 
is a complementary relationship, implying that for market opening to have the greatest benefits it must 
be accompanied with measures to improve economic governance performance. Our findings suggest 
that from a national welfare perspective deep integration efforts need to consider the relationship 
between market access and regulatory regimes. The fact that our empirical findings are obtained for 
EU member states – an economic union – demonstrates the general salience of our findings for the 
design of deep economic integration arrangements. 
Keywords 
Services trade liberalization, regulation, economic governance, deep integration 
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1. Introduction*  
The focus of trade agreements increasingly has turned to so-called deeper integration of markets (Dür, 
Baccini and Elsig, 2014). This contrasts with traditional, shallow integration trade agreements that 
center on the elimination of import tariffs and classical nontariff barriers (NTBs) such as quantitative 
restrictions. The steady decline in applied import tariffs around the world, in conjunction with more 
wide-ranging opening of markets to foreign investment and technological changes led to major 
changes in the organization of international production—exemplified by the rise of international value 
chains and cross-hauling of products and investment (Baldwin, 2016). This changed incentives of 
business interests towards the conclusion of new trade agreements (see, e.g., Eckhart and Poletti, 2016 
for the case of the EU) and to include trade in services, investment policies and rules of the game that 
reduce the prevalence and costs of regulatory heterogeneity (Hoekman and Sabel, 2017). In parallel, 
other interest groups sought to include disciplines relating to social, political and human rights into 
trade agreements as well as provisions relating to environmental regulation. This reflects different 
considerations, including a desire to ‘level the playing field’, address nonpecuniary negative 
spillovers, export ‘good practice’ norms and internationally agreed standards, and to safeguard the 
ability of governments to regulate economic behavior.
1
 Whatever the motivation, there is now a 
greater focus on “behind the border” regulatory policies in trade relations than in the past.  
The expansion in focus to addressing both market access and regulatory matters – towards deeper 
economic integration initiatives – has led to greater contestation of trade agreements. The backlash 
against the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU, and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks is illustrative. One reason for this is a 
concern by nongovernmental groups regarding a race to the bottom in product standards—illustrated 
by opposition in the EU to the prospect of being able to consume US chicken that has been washed 
with a chlorine solution. Another reason is a worry about “unfair competition” that may result if 
trading partners have weaker labor and environmental standards and thus lower costs of production. 
Yet another concern relates to inclusion of standards of protection for foreign investment and 
provisions that allow foreign investors to contest regulatory measures that result in “less favorable 
treatment” than what obtained when they initially made an investment. The associated enforcement 
mechanism – arbitration of investor-State disputes – became a focal point for widespread opposition to 
CETA and TTIP in the EU (Young, 2016).  
These issues are not new (De Bièvre and Poletti, 2017). Disciplines on product standards have been 
incorporated into trade agreements for some 40 years, dating back to the late 1970s (Mavroidis, 2016). 
Concerns about unfair international competition have a much longer history. What is new is that the 
focus of cooperation has broadened to include trade in services and associated cross-border movement 
of service providers, more generally foreign direct investment (FDI) policies, and regulatory regimes 
that act to restrict the ability (raise costs) for foreign firms to compete on the market. These are policy 
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areas where the approach traditionally taken in trade agreements – a reliance on basic 
nondiscrimination (national treatment) disciplines to ensure that commitments to reduce import tariffs 
could not be undercut through discriminatory application of domestic policies (so-called concession 
erosion) – is not sufficient. Instead, they involve elements of positive integration: cooperation aimed at 
ensuring that regulation satisfies minimum (common) standards, while at the same time ensuring that 
regulators have the freedom to impose stricter standards if they deem this to be necessary to assure 
health, safety or prudential objectives (Lester and Barbee, 2013; Mavroidis, 2016).  
In this paper we focus on services trade liberalization. This is an area where progress has been slow 
– many trade agreements cover services but most do so in a rather unambitious manner (Roy, 2016). 
There are a number of potential reasons for this (Hoekman and Mattoo, 2013). Liberalization involves 
both a market access dimension (removing discriminatory barriers against foreign firms) and a mix of 
rent-creating regulatory policies and measures aiming to address market failures. The latter are more 
complicated to address because of the need to identify and differentiate between successful rent-
creation by domestic providers (e.g., regulation that is designed to restrict entry) and measures that 
aim to address market failures (e.g., information asymmetries).  
Regulation affecting the operation of services sectors is both sector-specific and horizontal – 
impacting on all sectors, both goods and services-producing activities. Recent research has 
documented that the latter are important in affecting the size of the potential net gains from services 
liberalization (Beverelli et al. 2017). This complements similar findings for merchandise trade reforms 
and investment liberalization.
2
 An implication is that prevailing domestic economic governance 
institutions should be considered in the design and implementation of trade agreements. This is only 
done to a limited extent in practice – most of the focus in EU trade negotiations is on human and social 
rights and protection of the environment, not on more specific dimensions of economic regulation and 
related institutions (Fiorini and Hoekman, 2017). This gives rise to a number of questions, including 
whether trade agreements should include provisions that address economic governance and if so how. 
But independent of whether it makes sense to do so, if it is the case that regulatory regimes and 
institutions have a significant bearing on the gains from liberalization the implication is that a greater 
focus on understanding these relationships is called for.  
We assess the role of horizontal and sector-specific governance institutions in shaping the effects of 
policies affecting trade in producer services. Horizontal components of economic governance include 
barriers to entrepreneurship – such as complex and cumbersome administrative burdens on start-ups – 
and the extent of state-ownership and control of the economy. Sectoral dimensions comprise specific 
regulatory regimes that apply to services industries (e.g., to ensure access to network infrastructure, 
bottleneck facilities or interconnection; existence of an independent regulatory body; dedicated 
mechanisms to contest regulatory decisions; or whether the industry is permitted to regulate itself and 
define/control the conditions of entry as for certain professional services). We consider that services 
trade openness may be a substitute for pro-competitive domestic (horizontal and/or sectoral) regulation 
or a complement. Understanding whether and when there is likely to be complementarity or 
substitutability between services trade openness and different types of governance institutions is 
important for policy, as it can inform the design and sequencing of services trade reform 
commitments, in particular whether this should be preceded or accompanied by economic governance 
reforms and institutional strengthening. 
Our focus is on the downstream effects of services trade policy, i.e. on how it impacts the economic 
performance (productivity) of manufacturing sectors that use services as intermediate inputs. We 
recognize this restricts the scope of the analysis to just one dimension of the potential impact of such 
policies on the economic performance of countries. However, it is one that has been a central focus in 
the recent economic literature on the effects of sector specific trade policies (e.g., Amiti and Konings, 
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2007; Barone and Cingano, 2010; Arnold et al., 2016; Beverelli et al., 2017). Our analysis contributes 
to this line of research by exploring the relationship between different dimensions of domestic 
regulatory policies and trade policy instruments using the type of analytical framework employed in 
the literature. 
The empirical analysis centers on the EU. One reason is because the EU has done the most to 
pursue deep agreements with trading partners – recent examples include Canada and Japan – but more 
important is that the EU is the deepest integration arrangement extant, with member states 
participating in an economic union with full freedom of movement for goods, services, investment and 
people. The EU treaties and the many directives and regulations supporting the creation and operation 
of the Single Market imply a degree of economic integration that is much greater than what can 
attained with third countries. One would therefore expect that the findings of Beverelli et al. (2017), a 
recent large N, cross-section-based analysis using new measures of services trade policy, that 
governance and regulatory quality effects the gains from services liberalization would apply less to EU 
countries. The data reveal however that there is significant heterogeneity across EU member states in 
the quality of domestic economic governance and that EU countries do not have identical services 
trade policies. Fiorini and Hoekman (2017) show that these differences affect the impacts of services 
trade reforms enacted at the EU level and can result in significant asymmetry in the magnitude of the 
potential net benefits of EU services liberalization. Such distributional effects may have implications 
for political support for trade agreements across EU member states and may help explain some of the 
recent opposition in the EU to deep trade integration initiatives with third countries such as CETA and 
TTIP. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship between upstream services 
trade policy and downstream industry performance and the different roles regulatory and governance 
institutions may have in moderating the effects of services trade policy. We also present some 
descriptive evidence on relevant dimensions of economic governance in the EU. Section 3 presents the 
econometric framework and the data. Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section 
5 concludes with a discussion of implications of our findings for the design of trade agreements. 
2. Background 
2.1 Services trade reforms and downstream productivity 
Services such as finance, insurance, ICT services, transport and logistics are inputs into many 
production processes. Because of their relevance as inputs for downstream producers they are often 
referred to as producer or business services. Such services differ from manufactured intermediate 
inputs (parts and components). A key economic feature of producer services inputs is the role they 
play in coordinating and controlling complex production activities that are distributed over time and 
space. For instance, ICT, transport and logistics services connect workers and/or capital units across 
space; financial services allow firms to fund and manage the risk of routine as well as complex 
production operations over time. These services have become more important as businesses engage in 
international production and participate in global value chains (GVCs) that require the coordination of 
activities of different firms located in different geographical regions. As “facilitators” of unbundled 
and fragmented production processes, producer services inputs directly affect the feasibility of the 
associated specialization and the scale of downstream economic activity (Francois, 1990). 
Using linked input-output tables for OECD countries, Miroudot et al. (2009) find that 73% of all 
services trade between 1995 and 2005 was accounted for by trade in services inputs. This is a much 
bigger figure than in the case of trade in goods, where manufactured intermediate inputs accounted for 
56% of total trade flows in the same period. These patterns suggest that international trade in services 
Matteo Fiorini and Bernard Hoekman 
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is an important channel for firms to gain access to services inputs and/or reduce their 
production/operating costs. Restrictive trade and investment policies that reduce competition on 
services markets will have adverse consequences for the performance (competitiveness) of 
downstream manufacturing sectors by reducing and/or raising the cost of such access. 
Market access policies for producer services impact on the productivity of downstream firms or 
sectors through their effect on services sector performance. The latter is also influenced by regulatory 
policies that help determine the degree of competition in the relevant markets. Numerous studies have 
found that domestic regulation of services markets can have sizable impacts on downstream 
productivity and/or merchandise export performance.
3
 This line of research is consistent with the 
recent literature on liberalization of import tariffs on intermediate goods, which focuses on the 
downstream effects of input tariff reductions. Amiti and Konings (2007) show that reducing input 
tariffs by 10% increases productivity of Indonesian firms importing these inputs by 12%. Lower input 
tariffs can have a positive causal effect on downstream firms’ productivity by giving them access to 
more varieties or higher quality inputs and by allowing firms to learn from the foreign technology 
embedded in imported inputs. Analogous evidence comes from research on Indian firms. Goldberg et 
al. (2010) find that lowering input tariffs in India accounted for 31% of the new products introduced 
by Indian firms in the 1987-97 period. De Loecker et al. (2016) show that input tariff liberalization 
reduced marginal costs of downstream Indian producers. Similar empirical research on the effects of 
services trade restrictions identify sizable positive effects of services trade liberalization for the 
productivity and export performance of firms operating in downstream industries (notably 
manufacturing) – see, e.g., Arnold et al. (2011) for the case of Czech Republic.  
2.2 The role of governance institutions 
It is well established in the economic literature that, in the long run, the quality of institutions affects 
the level of comparative development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001) and that economic 
governance and related institutions represent an important source of comparative advantage in certain 
industries, especially those that are more contract-intensive (see Nunn and Trefler, 2014 for a survey). 
There is also substantial agreement in the literature that the benefits from trade liberalization depend 
on country-specific conditioning factors, notably the quality of local governance institutions (see 
Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Freund and Bolaky, 2008; and Ahsan, 2013). The quality of economic 
governance institutions can also be expected to affect the downstream effects of services trade 
reforms. 
Beverelli et al. (2017) find that in the short and medium run, governance variables such as the 
strength of the rule of law, control of corruption and the quality of domestic regulation can shape the 
downstream effects of services trade policies. They conclude that removing barriers to cross-border 
services trade will have less beneficial effects on performance in cases where pervasive corruption and 
weak governance generates excessive economic uncertainty and insecurity. This is consistent with 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Ranjan and Lee (2007), who find that uncertainty created by 
low-quality-institutions reduces inward trade flows. An implication is that eliminating restrictions on 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) may fail to generate positive downstream effect if weak 
governance institutions in the host country are the binding constraint and discourage foreign firms 
from responding to the liberalization (or, if they enter, induces them to operate inefficiently, use 
outdated technology, etc. – see, e.g., Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Dreher and Grassebner, 2013; and 
Dort, Méon, and Sekkat, 2014). 
The literature analyzing the interaction between measures of governance quality such as control of 
corruption and rule of law as defined in the Worldwide Governance Indicators database and similar 
compilations suggests there is a complementary relationship between the quality of domestic 
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governance and the magnitude of the benefits of market access liberalization, i.e., better governance 
enhances the positive effects of liberalization. The various governance indicators used in this literature 
are proxies for the quality of the investment climate in a country. They are horizontal in nature, in the 
sense that affect activities in all sectors. They are likely to capture to a greater or lesser extent the 
effects of more specific dimensions of economic governance that determine the conditions of entry 
into a market. Examples include the scope of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, 
government involvement in price setting (price controls), licensing and permit systems, and services 
sector specific regulation. Determining the extent to which the latter types of economic governance 
and regulatory policies impact on the benefits of services trade liberalization is important from a 
policy perspective as it may be both easier to change sector or activity-specific regulation than it is to 
improve rule of law or to combat corruption and, as important, more feasible to do so in the short run.  
Broad governance variables and associated institutions that determine the extent to which the rule 
of law prevails are entrenched in the economic system and effectively are likely to be exogenous to 
short and even medium term economic policy reforms such as market access opening. Improving rule 
of law and controlling corruption requires time as it entails general systemic reforms in public 
administration, the civil service and political institutions. This is less the case for sector-level 
regulation or regulatory measures that affect entry or conduct of firms. Insofar as the complementarity 
relationship found in Beverelli et al. (2017) between broad governance variables and services trade 
reforms holds for narrower types of economic governance this would imply policy reforms should 
center on the latter so as to complement services trade liberalization initiatives. Alternatively, it may 
be the case that market opening can substitute for sectoral governance reforms. If so, it may be 
appropriate to prioritize services trade liberalization.  
To illustrate, consider the case of barriers to entrepreneurship captured by the degree of complexity 
and clarity of the regulatory requirements pertaining to the establishment and operation of firms. Low 
quality economic governance reflected in complex and ambiguous regulations that are difficult to 
account for in business plans may generate uncertainty, a need to plan for unpredictable shocks to 
production processes and as a result deter investment by firms. Large foreign services providers, 
equipped with a superior technology and greater resources than domestic providers of similar services, 
may be able to deal with such a regulatory environment. If so, this gives rise to a substitutability 
relationship between domestic governance and market access reforms: opening the market to foreign 
providers can substitute for good domestic governance in terms of increasing the quality, variety 
and/or decreasing the price of services inputs used by domestic manufacturing firms. 
The extent to which good domestic economic governance is a necessary condition for strong 
positive downstream effects of services market access reforms is an empirical question. The 
relationship between the performance of regulatory institutions and changes in services trade policy 
will be determined in part by how restrictive horizontal (cross-cutting) regulatory measures are in 
constraining new entry and reducing the ability of firms to operate profitably once they have 
established, and in part by the types of market failure that motivates sector-specific regulation.
4
 
Focusing on the first dimension, the impact on regulation on entry and/or operating costs will vary. 
Some types of regulation – e.g., a simple registration requirement – will only impose a small burden 
on operators. Other types of regulation may be very difficult for new entrants to overcome and can 
even prohibit entry – e.g., a ban on investment in complementary infrastructure facilities such as a 
warehouse/logistics center; highly restrictive economic needs tests; or regulation that reserves certain 
types of transactions to a SOE. The benefits of reducing services trade barriers (i.e., policies that 
discriminate against foreign providers and foreign services) will be affected by the applicable 
measures regulating entry. As long as these are not prohibitive, the most (more) efficient foreign 
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providers can be expected to be able to satisfy the regulatory requirements. These may raise costs 
above what they would be if, for example, regulatory cooperation allowed mutual recognition or 
equivalence, but some level of trade can be expected to occur. In this case market access can be a 
substitute for regulatory reform. If, however, regulation is such as to essentially preclude entry – e.g., 
because of state control of prices or the existence of SOEs that dominate (segments of) the market – 
services trade liberalization may not have much of an effect in changing incentives to enter the market. 
There is then more likely to be a complementary relationship between services trade policy and sector-
level regulation: to generate pro-competitive dynamics reforms will need to target both policy areas. 
Turning to sector-specific economic governance, similar forces may arise as with cross-sectoral 
(horizontal) regulatory regimes but there is likely to be an additional dimension: the extent to which 
different types of market failures (or, from a normative perspective should) motivate regulation. For 
example, in the case of services sectors where there are significant network externalities there may be 
a rationale for public provision of (investment in) infrastructure and regulation of the relevant network 
to ensure interconnection and access. In other sectors, market failure may reflect information 
asymmetries. In case of transport and telecommunications services, network infrastructure 
considerations are important. Weak regulatory regimes that permit exploitation of market power by 
incumbent operators can prohibit entry by new operators. Insofar as this is the case, it cannot be offset 
by services trade liberalization as it will often be prohibitively expensive for new entrants to develop 
their own network infrastructure. The implication is that liberalization will not allow foreign firms to 
overcome a government’s failure to put in place and enforce pro-competitive regulation. Absent such 
regulation, market access liberalization can be expected to have smaller positive downstream 
productivity effects. There is then complementarity between the quality of regulation and the 
magnitude of the potential benefits of services trade liberalization. 
Such complementarity is less likely to arise for producer services where network externalities are 
less prevalent or do not figure at all. In the case of business and professional services, for example, the 
main rationale for regulation is to deal with problems of asymmetric information. In cases where 
domestic regulation is ineffective in addressing such problems – e.g., by putting in place certification 
processes that allow low quality providers to operate, create moral hazard, or permitting regulatory 
systems that create significant rents for domestic incumbents – liberalization of access to the market 
for foreign providers may allow such regulatory failures to be overcome to some extent. For example, 
they can establish a reputation for quality by leveraging foreign regulatory certification and/or 
international certification (such as compliance with ISO standards). As long as domestic regulation 
does not take the form of a binding quantitative restriction on entry – which presumably is something 
that will be the focus of market access negotiations, the result is likely to be a substitution relationship 
between domestic sectoral regulation/governance and market access reform. 
In addition to the horizontal and sector-specific dimensions of economic regulation, a feature of the 
governance—market access relationship that is relevant in the EU context is the role of common EU 
institutions and EU law. EU membership is associated with a set of obligations to apply EU law and 
regulation and to pursue shared values. In the case of services, the Single Market Strategy and 
associated EU directives, combined with monitoring of implementation by the European Commission; 
the possibility of infringement procedures and challenging specific policies before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union; and, ultimately, penalties for non-compliance are likely to affect the extent to 
which domestic regulatory regimes and economic governance institutions affect market access 
liberalization across EU member states. Understanding whether such EU-specific dimensions of 
governance have a complementary or substitution relationship with reforms aimed at enhancing 
market access is a relevant question from the perspective of the design of deep integration agreements 
in general. However, it is also relevant for the EU itself in the pursuit of deep trade agreements with 
third countries.  
In the case of complementarity, implementation of EU Directives may increase the potential gains 
from liberalizing services markets. In such cases member states with better governance may 
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experience larger economic gains from market access liberalization than countries with weaker 
governance. Insofar as the latter are also countries with lower per capita income levels, the implication 
is an asymmetric distribution of the gains from services trade reforms that are agreed in external trade 
negotiations by the EU – richer countries with above average governance will benefit more. This has 
obvious implications for public support for EU trade agreements. An implication is that policy efforts 
should focus on improving attainment of common regulatory standards before or in parallel with 
external market access liberalization for services. In contrast, in the substitutability case, there is 
greater potential for realizing gains from services liberalization in the short run in EU member states 
with relatively low levels of regulatory performance and incomplete compliance with the EU Service 
Directive. From a political economy perspective in these cases liberalization of market access 
restrictions should be prioritized. 
2.3 Services trade policy and governance in EU Member states 
The EU does not (yet) have a common external services trade and investment policy. Nor do the EU 
member states have the same quality of economic governance or service-sector specific regulatory 
regimes. Table 2.1 reports values for an indicator of applied discriminatory barriers to FDI in services 
– what is called mode 3 services trade barriers in WTO speak – for four producer services sectors and 
24 member states in 2010.
5
 This is a good proxy for countries’ services trade restrictiveness as FDI is 
the most important mode through which foreign providers can contest markets and supply services 
(Francois and Hoekman, 2010). The data reveal substantial heterogeneity across EU members and 
sectors. FDI restrictions for financial services appear to be minimal everywhere in the EU, whereas 
barriers in transport, telecommunications and business services are relatively significant for several 
member states. FDI restrictions in the transport sector tend to be the highest for many countries. 
Figures 2.1-2.3 report data on four horizontal or cross-cutting dimensions of economic governance as 
well as for 3 sector-specific ones across EU member states and time.  
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Figure 2.1. Governance: horizontal dimensions across EU Member States 
 
Note: 1 = highest barriers/minimum quality. Data refer to the quality of governance in 2013. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation, Economy Wide Database. 
Figure 2.2. Governance: sector-specific dimensions across EU Member States 
 
Note: 1 = highest barriers/minimum quality. Data refer to the quality of governance in 2013. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation, ETCR and Professional Services Database. 
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Table 2.1. Applied discriminatory barriers to services trade (Mode 3 GATS) 
Country Transport Telecom Finance Business 
AUT 0.182 0 0.002 0.322 
BEL 0.114 0.023 0.024 0.248 
CZE 0.075 0 0.010 0 
DEU 0.200 0.013 0.005 0 
DNK 0.083 0 0.002 0.363 
ESP 0.075 0.112 0.002 0.113 
EST 0.150 0 0.002 0 
FIN 0.092 0.009 0.011 0.046 
FRA 0.150 0.024 0.054 0.003 
GBR 0.114 0.135 0.024 0.023 
GRC 0.150 0.056 0.020 0.056 
HUN 0.167 0 0.005 0 
IRL 0.125 0 0.009 0 
ITA 0.200 0.182 0.018 0 
LTU 0.280 0.005 0.006 0.005 
LUX 0.075 0 0.002 0 
LVA 0.084 0.009 0.011 0.009 
NLD 0.083 0 0.002 0 
POL 0.092 0.187 0.003 0 
PRT 0.083 0 0.017 0 
ROU 0.167 0 0.002 0 
SVK 0.075 0 0.002 0 
SVN 0.150 0 0.002 0 
SWE 0.292 0.200 0.002 0.051 
AUT 0.182 0 0.002 0.322 
BEL 0.114 0.023 0.024 0.248 
Note: 1 = maximum restrictions; 0 = no restrictions. Data refer to the applied policy stance in 
2010. Source: OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Database. 
 
The horizontal indicators reported are from the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) database 
and span barriers to entrepreneurship, the extent of state control of the economy, a composite measure 
of the complexity of regulatory regimes, and the governance of state-owned enterprises. These PMR 
indicators suggest substantial heterogeneity in these governance-related variables in the EU (Figure 
2.1) and a positive trend toward better quality economic governance over time, especially for barriers 
to entrepreneurship (Figure 2.3). Similar conclusions can be drawn from the data on sector-specific 
dimensions of governance (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). The indicators used here are again sourced from the 
PMR database of the OECD and refer to sectoral governance in transport, telecommunication and 
finance. 
More detailed measures of policy can be constructed for EU member states based on the degree of 
compliance with EU Directives which contain requirements pertaining to the governance of services 
sectors. A key instrument is the Services Directive which was adopted in 2006, with transposition to 
have been completed by 2009. This directive covers services sectors accounting for some 45 percent 
of EU GDP. It imposes disciplines on the use of prior authorizations for provision of services, 
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licensing for retail stores, specific authorizations for the sale of certain products at retail level and 
economic needs tests for retail outlets (Art. 9). It requires the removal of explicitly discriminatory 
policies such as nationality tests, requirements that a provider establish or join a professional body if 
this has already been done in an EU member state, that the firm’s headquarters be located in the 
country, conditioning operations on economic needs tests, requiring financial guarantees or insurance 
from a host country provider, and involvement of (domestic) competitors in the process of granting 
authorization to operate (Art. 14). It also imposes disciplines on non-discriminatory regulatory 
requirements that may impede market access– e.g., limits on the number of establishments that are 
permitted or requirements that a firm employ a minimum number of employees (Art. 16). 
Figure 2.3. Governance: horizontal and sector-specific dimensions over time  
 
Note: 1 = highest barriers/minimum quality. Data refer to the quality of governance in 2013. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation, Economy Wide Database 
Art. 15 SD imposes disciplines on countries maintaining potentially competition-restricting regulatory 
measures justified on public interest grounds. Such measures– e.g., quantitative or territorial 
limitations, restrictions on the legal form of an entity, requirements concerning equity holdings, or 
price controls – must be transparent. To help assure this, governments are required to establish Points 
of Single Contact – “one-stop shops” where firms can obtain all necessary information on 
requirements that need to be satisfied to provide services in a country. Art. 15 also imposes specific 
substantive disciplines. Measures may not directly or indirectly discriminate according to nationality 
and/or, in the case of companies, on the basis of the location of the registered office; they must be 
justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest (a necessity test) and not go beyond 
what is necessary to attain that public interest objective (a proportionality test). An important 
dimension of implementation of Art. 15 is a mutual evaluation process. Member states are tasked with 
assessing for themselves whether their regulatory requirements satisfy the substantive criteria of Art. 
15 (necessity, proportionality) and must share their reasoning with other member states. 
Table 2.2 reports data for 2014 on EU Member State compliance with the 2006 Services Directive 
in six selected sectors: accounting, architecture, engineering, legal services, tax advisers and hotels. 
Looking at the hotels sector, the data show almost complete compliance (full transposition) across all 
member states. This contrasts with the situation for legal services, a key component of the producer 
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services sector and an important input into manufacturing production. The data suggest that many 
countries are not fully complying with the requirements of the Services Directive across relevant 
producer services, including also professional services such as architecture and engineering services. 
Table 2.2. EU Services Directive transposition in selected sectors 
Country Accountants Architects Engineers 
 Legal 
services 
Tax advisers Hotels 
AUT 0.848 0.764 0.839 0.689 0.709 0.914 
BEL 0.689 0.689 0.839 0.614 0.614 0.914 
BGR 0.953 0.624 0.624 0.612 0.953 0.938 
CYP 0.877 0.829 0.877 0.631 0.938 0.938 
CZE 0.974 0.629 0.854 0.734 0.854 0.914 
DEU 0.629 0.539 0.674 0.569 0.459 0.974 
DNK 0.813 0.974 0.974 0.710 0.974 0.974 
ESP 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.836 0.974 0.974 
EST 0.916 0.974 0.974 0.733 0.974 0.974 
FIN 0.859 0.974 0.974 0.882 0.974 0.974 
FRA 0.779 0.733 0.974 0.733 0.779 0.974 
GBR 0.914 0.854 0.974 0.794 0.974 0.974 
GRC 0.914 0.914 0.914 0.695 0.914 0.918 
HRV 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HUN 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.569 0.794 0.914 
IRL 0.974 0.914 0.974 0.674 0.974 0.974 
ITA 0.751 0.751 0.751 0.654 0.751 0.974 
LTU 1 0.906 0.906 0.741 0.953 1 
LUX 0.848 0.709 0.848 0.629 0.779 0.914 
LVA 1 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.953 1 
MLT 0.846 0.692 0.692 0.692 1 0.938 
NLD 0.839 0.914 0.914 0.839 0.914 0.914 
POL 0.974 0.882 0.882 0.790 0.779 0.914 
PRT 0.733 0.882 0.882 0.629 0.974 0.914 
ROU 0.714 0.657 0.886 0.657 0.714 1 
SVK 0.854 0.779 0.854 0.854 0.794 0.974 
SVN 0.928 0.871 0.928 0.710 0.928 0.974 
SWE 0.623 0.918 0.918 0.695 0.918 0.914 
Note: Simple average of implementation of the Services Directive across requirements. 1 = 
complete implementation; 0 = no implementation. Data capture extent of implementation in 
2014. Source: European Commission. 
3. Empirical Specification and Data 
The object of the empirical analysis that follows is to assess the role of different dimensions of 
governance institutions in shaping the downstream effects of trade policies targeting producer 
services. The results will inform the above discussion of the mechanics governing the relationship 
(complementarity versus substitutability) between trade openness and governance institutions in the 
context of producer services markets. We follow Beverelli et al. (2017) and use a measure of labour 
productivity varying at the country   and manufacturing sector   level (   ) as dependent variable. To 
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capture the impact of services trade restrictiveness on downstream sectors we define a composite 
(services) trade restrictiveness index defined as: 
 
      ∑         
 
 
where      is a restrictiveness index for imports (foreign sales) of service   in country  , and      is a 
measure of how much downstream sector   in country   uses service   as an intermediate input to 
produce its output.
6
 The main focus of the analysis will be on the interaction between       and 
detailed measures of country-level governance institutions capturing the specific dimension of 
governance   (     ), as follows: 
 
                   (                     )                         (1) 
where          is the capital-labor ratio, a relevant determinant of productivity that is potentially 
correlated with           ;     and     are country-time and sector-time fixed effects, respectively; and 
     is the error term. 
The estimated marginal effects of     on   are given by: 
 
  
    
̂
  ̂   ̂        
and depend on country-level institutions captured by the variable      . The sign of  ̂ will identify the 
nature of the moderating role of institutions (complement or substitute) in influencing the downstream 
productivity effects of producer services trade policy. For each dimension  , the respective version of 
equation (1) is estimated. 
In a baseline model without the interaction term            , the marginal effect of     on labour 
productivity is given by the estimated coefficient,  ̂. Based on the empirical evidence in the literature 
discussed above we expect  ̂ to be negative and statistically significant. Reducing restrictions to trade 
in producer services (i.e., a decrease in the value of   , reflected in a proportional decrease in    ) is 
expected to increase the labor productivity of downstream manufacturing sectors. A positive sign for 
the point estimate  ̂ in the interaction model (1) would then suggest that a lower value of the 
moderating governance variable     is associated with a larger positive impact of reducing services 
trade restrictions on downstream manufacturing.  
We assess the moderating role of seven horizontal dimensions of governance and three sector 
specific ones using OECD data (see below). Horizontal dimensions consist of two aggregate 
composite categories, barriers to entrepreneurs (               ) and state control (            ), and five 
sub-categories. Three of these are elements of the composite measure of barriers to entrepreneurship – 
(i) administrative burdens (               ); (ii) complexity of regulations (                   ); and (iii) 
regulatory protection of incumbent operators (                  ). The other two sub-categories are 
                                                     
6
 The construction of such composite policy indicator is standard in the related literature assessing the economic effects of 
sector-specific (trade) policy for the performance of downstream activities/firms using the output of the sector target by 
the policy as intermediate input in their production process (see among others Amiti and Konings, 2007 and Beverelli et 
al., 2017). 
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elements of the composite indicator of state control: (iv) a measure of the extent of government 
intervention in business (                 ); and (v) the relative importance of state owned enterprises 
(                  ). The three sector-specific regulatory governance measures pertain to transport 
(           ), post and telecommunications (         ), and business services (          ).             is 
the simple average of five indicators: scope of public ownership in air transports, scope of public 
ownership in rail transport, price regulation in road transport, market structure in the rail transport 
sector, and vertical integration in rail transport.           is the simple average of four indicators: scope 
of public ownership in the postal sector, market structure of the postal sector, scope of public 
ownership in the telecommunications, and market structure of the telecommunication sector.            
is the simple average of four conduct regulation indicators for accountants, architects, engineers and 
legal service providers.  
All of these variables range between 0 and 1. The lower the value, the higher the quality of the 
associated governance institutions in a pro-competitive sense. Therefore, a positive sign for  ̂ is 
suggestive of a complementarity role of domestic governance with respect to market access 
liberalization: reducing barriers to services trade has a stronger positive effect on downstream 
manufacturing sectors given higher quality of domestic economic governance. In contrast, a negative 
sign for the estimate of  ̂ suggests a substitutability role of domestic governance with respect to 
market access liberalization: when domestic governance is weak, opening markets for producer 
services to international trade and investment has a strong positive effect on the productivity of 
downstream manufacturing sectors. 
To assess the moderating function of governance dimensions that reflect the role of EU institutions 
we define the following three variables. A dummy      taking value 1 if the Services Directive is in 
force in country   at time  ; two continuous variables –           and                – that measure the 
level of compliance of country   at time   with the Services Directive Requirements. The first of these 
variables includes all service sectors covered by the SD and on which we have data (this includes 
business services and several non-producer services such as hotels, restaurants, travel agencies). The 
second variable includes only business services. Both variables range between 0 to 1 with 0 (1) 
representing minimum (maximum) compliance. We then re-estimate equation (1), replacing       with 
each of these three proxies of EU related governance institutions. The interpretation of the estimated 
sign for the coefficient   is consistent with the definition of each EU-related governance variable. In 
general, a value of 1 for these moderators means that the associated dimension of governance is 
active/present, mainly in the form of applicability of/compliance with the requirements of the Services 
Directive. Therefore, a negative sign for the point estimate  ̂ reflects a relationship between market 
access liberalization and EU-based domestic governance such that the positive downstream effects of 
the former are amplified where EU institutions are more deeply embedded in domestic governance 
through applicability of/compliance with the Services Directive. 
Endogeneity resulting from observable and/or unobservable heterogeneity is not a major concern 
for the chosen specification. Country-time and sector-time fixed effects control for any country- or 
sector-specific time contingent shock that has the property of affecting both labour productivity and 
the regressors of interest. Endogeneity of input-output weights is addressed in a standard way as 
discussed below. 
Data on labour productivity are sourced from the STAN Database managed by the OECD. 
Concretely, we measure labour productivity as the natural logarithm of the ratio between value added 
and total employed persons. Capital and labour measures used to construct the capital-labour ratio 
come from the same database. Services trade policy is measured with the OECD FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index. This is available for multiple years, in contrast to the recent World Bank and 
OECD services trade restrictiveness indicators. Given the findings of empirical work in this area that 
FDI policies (affecting mode 3) are what matters (Francois and Hoekman, 2010; Beverelli et al., 
2017), the focus on mode 3 (FDI) policies is not a major limitation. Horizontal governance variables 
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come from the OECD Product Market Regulation – Economy Wide Database. Indicators reported in 
the PMR database that entail discrimination against foreign providers such as trade and FDI related 
policies are not used as market access policy is captured by the FDI restrictiveness indicator. 
Similarly, measures that entail discriminatory barriers to entry are systematically excluded from the 
construction of the sector specific regulatory variables. Proxies for the input-output weights      are 
given by the technical coefficients of IO matrices. To minimize the potential endogeneity of this 
component of the composite reform indicator we use US input-output (IO) coefficients for the mid-
1990s and apply these across all countries in our estimation sample.
7
 The IO data is drawn from the 
OECD STAN IO Database. The measures of transport- and telecommunication-specific governance 
are sourced from the OECD PMR – ETCR Database. The business-services specific governance 
variable is built from indicators in the OECD PMR Professional Services Database. 
The proxy for compliance with the requirements in the Services Directive is constructed from the 
database presented in Monteagudo et al. (2012). That database contains information on compliance 
with the main requirements of the Services Directive for fifteen services sectors. For each country-
sector pair, the database identifies a number of key policy areas embedded in 20 requirements across 
five key articles of the Services Directive.
8 
The database permits the construction of an indicator of the 
distance between the policy regime prevailing in country  , sector  , at time   and the objective 
specified by the Services Directive embodied in requirement  . This measure of ‘convergence’, 
      , takes four discrete values between 0 or 1, with 0 (1) indicating minimum (maximum) 
convergence with the Services Directive requirements. Intermediate values of 0.2 and 0.8 are defined 
to account for partial compliance with the requirements.
9
 Starting from this convergence variable, 
       is computed as the simple average of        across all requirements and sectors. Similarly, 
            is given by the simple average of        across all requirements for those business services 
for which data are reported (accounting, architectural, engineering, legal, and tax advisory services). 
Some of the data series used in the analysis are not annual but span a selection of years. This is the 
case for the PMR Economy Wide Database, the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Database and the SD 
Database. In these cases we construct a panel by imputing the missing value at time   with the non-
missing value at time    . Alternative imputation strategies as well as a conservative approach that 
uses only the reports data points do not substantially change the main results presented in the next 
section.
10
 
Merging all variables together, we obtain an estimation sample consisting of 2840 observations 
which cover 12 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK) plus Norway; up to 18 manufacturing 
sectors defined according to the ISIC Rev 3 (2 digit) categories; and 21 years, from 1989 to 2009. 
Table I.1 in Annex I reports summary statistics for all the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
4. Results 
Estimation results are organized per type of domestic governance variable. Column (1) in Table 4.1 
reports the benchmark estimates from a regression without the interaction term. The other columns 
present point estimates and standard errors for the coefficients in equation (1) when proxies of 
horizontal governance are interacted with the composite reform indicator. 
                                                     
7
 For discussion and assessments of the appropriateness of using US weights as an indicator of the technological linkages 
between industries see Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Barone and Cingano (2011). 
8
 The relevant SD provisions are Articles 9, 14, 15, 16 and 25. Monteagudo et al. (2012) and Canton at al. (2014) provide 
economic impact assessments of liberalization of services covered by the SD.
 
9
 See Monteagudo et al. (2012) for a detailed description of the database. 
10
 Results of these robustness tests are available upon request. 
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The estimated coefficient for     in column (1) is negative and statistically significant. This 
replicates the finding in the literature of a positive downstream effect of removing market access 
barriers for services. The point estimate of -0.815 implies that a one standard deviation decrease in the 
composite reform indicator (-0.048) increases downstream labor productivity on average by 3.9%.
11
 
Turning to the interaction models in columns (2)-(8), a number of findings emerge. First, when the 
marginal effect of     is allowed to change linearly with the quality of regulatory/governance 
institutions, the relationship varies across the horizontal governance proxies. This illustrates the 
salience of ‘unpacking’ regulatory regimes in assessments of the moderating role of governance 
quality: this heterogeneity is lost when macro measures of institutions are used. Second, the negative 
and statistically significant coefficients of the interaction term in columns (2) and (4) suggest that 
greater market access for services inputs can act as a substitute for reducing regulatory barriers to 
entrepreneurship. It also suggests that of the elements that make up this composite indicator, the 
complexity of regulatory regimes is particularly important (column 4). This is consistent with the 
hypothesis advanced above that foreign providers, once granted better market access, can offer better 
quality, variety and/or prices than domestic providers by successfully overcoming prevailing barriers 
to entrepreneurship. These results are plotted in Annex I Figures I.1 and I.2, which show that the 
estimated marginal effect of     decreases with    and is always negative and statistically different 
from 0 (meaning a positive downstream effect of reducing trade restrictions) when barriers to 
entrepreneurship are high (the quality of governance captured by this variable is low).  
Third, the alternative measure of horizontal economic governance – captured by the scope of SOEs 
in the economy – tends to operate as a necessary condition for a positive downstream effect of services 
trade liberalization. This is suggested by the positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient 
of the interaction term in columns (6) and (8). The corresponding estimated marginal effects of     
are reported in Annex I Figures I.3 and I.4. The effect is increasing in the moderator. Moreover, it is 
negative and statistically significant (meaning a positive downstream effect of reducing trade 
restrictions) when the barriers implied by state control or by the scope of prevailing SOEs are low 
enough (i.e., the quality of governance in this dimensions is high). This finding is consistent with the 
discussion in section 2.2 and indicates that bad governance in terms of public ownership affects 
market conditions in a way that cannot be overcome by foreign services providers. Better market 
access in producer services is ineffective in increasing downstream productivity when the barriers 
implied by the scope and governance of SOEs are too high. 
 
  
                                                     
11
 More detailed quantifications of the downstream effects of trade policy changes is beyond the scope of this paper. Our 
empirical methodology implies that quantification of the effects of changes in the policy variables alone can only be 
conducted at the manufacturing sector level. We adopt the simpler approach of looking at the effects of changes in the 
composite policy indicator (de facto treating it as a policy variable in itself) given our focus on analyzing the potentially 
heterogeneous role of different dimensions of regulatory governance in moderating the downstream effects of services 
trade policy as opposed to quantification of the magnitude of these effects. Analogous quantification approaches are used 
in the literature looking at the impact of import tariff reforms for downstream firms or industries—see for instance Amiti 
and Konings (2009). 
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Table 4.1. The moderating role of governance institutions: horizontal dimensions  
Dep var: log of 
labour productivity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    -0.815*** 1.079 -0.552 -0.264 -0.458 -2.504*** -0.413 -4.954*** 
 (0.271) (1.037) (0.747) (0.382) (0.703) (0.748) (0.602) (0.773) 
                     -4.846**       
  (2.349)       
                           -0.441      
   (1.126)      
                                -1.895**     
    (0.919)     
                                -0.784    
     (1.275)    
                         3.288**   
      (1.271)   
                                 -1.099  
       (1.302)  
                                   7.251*** 
        (1.230) 
       0.137*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.131*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
         
Observations 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 
Adj. R-squared 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.784 
 
Note: All specifications include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country-time level are reported between brackets. Statistical significance: * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Table 4.2 reports results for the interaction model when the regulatory variable is sector-specific, for 
three sectors: transport, telecommunications and business services. As with the horizontal economic 
governance measures, the moderating role of sector-specific regulatory differs across sectors, 
suggesting it is important to differentiate between sectoral regulatory regimes. High quality regulation 
of transport and telecommunications appears to be a necessary condition for positive downstream 
effects of services trade reforms. This is shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficients 
of the interaction term in columns (2) and (3) (for the graphical counterpart, see the corresponding 
plots of the marginal effect of     in Annex I, Figures I.5 and I.6). The opposite relationship 
(substitutability) holds for business services. These results are consistent with reasoning in section 2.2 
that the quality of conduct regulation in sectors that rely heavily on access to network infrastructure 
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(especially the case for telecommunication services) may be condition the ability of foreign services 
providers to operate efficiently and therefore improve the quality, variety or prices of services 
available on the market. Absent effective pro-competitive sectoral regulation downstream productivity 
benefits of market access reforms do not materialize. Conversely, low quality sectoral regulation of 
business services appears to inhibit foreign services providers less. The negative coefficient estimate 
for business services in column 4 of Table 4.2 suggests a substitution relationship: market access 
reforms have the potential to trigger positive downstream effects in countries where the business 
sector is badly regulated. 
Table 4.2. The moderating role of governance institutions: sector-specific dimensions  
Dep var: log of labour productivity (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    -0.815*** -2.313*** -2.960*** 0.242 
 (0.271) (0.782) (0.864) (0.630) 
                 2.161**   
  (1.002)   
                3.332***  
   (1.089)  
                  -1.584** 
    (0.770) 
       0.137*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
     
Observations 2840 2840 2840 2840 
Adj. R-squared 0.782 0.782 0.783 0.782 
 
Note: All specifications include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country-time level are reported between brackets. Statistical significance: * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the interaction model using the proxies for EU-related governance 
institutions and restricting the same to EU countries. The narrowly defined measures of economic 
governance such as the Services Directive dummy and the country-specific compliance measures do 
not seem to have any effect on downstream sectors. This may reflect the focus of the Services 
Directive, which spans a wide range of services, many of which enter into final demand as opposed to 
being inputs into production (e.g., hotels, restaurants, tourist agencies). However, the same finding 
holds if the focus is limited to compliance for business services only. Of course this does not mean 
that the SD has not had effects. Monteagudo et al. (2012) for example find that the SD and compliance 
with its requirements has a sizable direct positive effect on the productivity of the targeted services 
sectors. 
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Table 4.3. The moderating role of governance institutions: the EU dimension  
Dep var: log of labour productivity (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    -0.815*** -0.884*** -0.878*** -0.900*** 
 (0.271) (0.267) (0.268) (0.273) 
        0.376   
  (0.693)   
             0.422  
   (0.840)  
                   0.680 
    (1.026) 
       0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
     
Observations 2840 2840 2840 2840 
Adj. R-squared 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 
 
Note: All specifications include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country-time level are reported between brackets. Statistical significance: * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
The results of this analysis suggest that countries that underperform in terms of domestic economic 
governance variables that are likely to have a complementary relationship with services market access 
liberalization should prioritize reforms to improve governance performance. Areas of 
regulation/governance where this may be the case include public ownership and conduct regulation in 
transport and telecommunication sectors. However, in cases where market access can substitute for 
regulatory improvement the policy implication of our analysis is that there is less need to be concerned 
with sequencing or coordination between services trade liberalization and pursuit of regulatory reform 
and improving economic governance. The empirical findings above suggest that substitutability may 
be prevalent for instances where countries perform poorly with respect to barriers to entrepreneurship 
and conduct regulation in business services. 
5. Conclusion 
Services comprise a substantial share of all inputs used by firms. The cost, quality and variety of 
services available to firms is one determinant of their competitiveness. Sector-specific restrictive trade 
policies will impact on the degree of competition on services markets, and thus markups and sectoral 
efficiency. They will also impact on the availability and quality of services. Recent compilations of 
prevailing policies across countries by the OECD and the World Bank have shown that barriers to 
trade in services are often significant, translating into estimates of ad valorem tariff equivalents that 
are substantially higher than trade barriers for goods (Jafari and Tarr, 2017). These considerations 
suggest governments should pursue unilateral services trade liberalization. This may confront political 
economy difficulties, however, as a result of the rents created by trade-restrictive policies. Trade 
agreements offer a potential instrument to address constraints that impede welfare-enhancing domestic 
policy reforms. The underlying dynamics are well-understood – a trade agreement can incentivize 
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groups that will benefit from better access to partner markets to counteract the domestic political 
pressure of firms and sectors that stand to lose rents from market opening measures.  
In practice most trade agreements have done relatively little to liberalize trade in services, 
especially agreements including developing nations. In the EU context, certain services sectors – such 
as medical services, educational services, or audio-visual services – are often deemed too ‘sensitive’ to 
table in a trade negotiation. Thus, potential welfare gains from greater competition are not realized. 
Part of the explanation for the limited outcomes on services are differences in regulation, an 
understandable unwillingness to accept the regulatory standards and norms prevailing in partner 
countries and, more generally, the challenges associated with regulatory cooperation. In principle, 
countries can (and do) simply insist on applying national regulatory measures to both domestic and 
foreign firms. While such a national treatment approach implies country-specific fixed costs for 
foreign firms, if they are productive enough to be able to offer better/cheaper services once they have 
complied with regulatory requirements, they will benefit from liberalization of market access 
barriers—as will domestic consumers. In such cases liberalization can act as a partial substitute for 
domestic regulatory reforms, and standard trade negotiation dynamics can ‘work’ in delivering gains 
from market opening.  
The empirical results in this paper illustrate that this dynamic does not hold across the board. In 
some instances liberalization will not deliver significant gains unless regulatory reforms are 
implemented. More importantly, the analysis points to a need for greater attention to be given to 
economic governance and regulatory quality when pursuing services market access liberalization and 
in the design of deep trade agreements that include services. We go beyond recent research showing 
that weak governance may substantially reduce the magnitude of the potential benefits of services 
trade policy reforms by ‘unpacking’ different dimensions of regulation and economic governance. 
Despite the deep integration of EU member state markets, there are substantial differences across 
countries when it comes to services trade policies towards the rest of the world as well as salient 
domestic regulatory regimes, both of a horizontal nature (affecting the economy as a whole) and 
services-sector specific. The finding that in some circumstances services trade policy reforms can 
substitute for action to improve domestic regulatory governance, whereas in others it cannot, suggests 
that more attention be given to the relationship between regulatory institutions and services trade 
reforms when designing deep integration agreements.  
The fact that our empirical findings apply to members of the EU – an economic union – 
demonstrates that the pursuit of the textbook ‘linear’ model ” in which regional integration proceeds 
from free trade agreements to a customs union, a common market and economic union is not sufficient 
to ensure that the potential benefits of market integration will be realized. This is of course not a new 
insight, but it supports the view that regulatory policies and economic governance variables be 
considered in the design of deeper integration initiatives, whether these take the form of free trade 
agreements that include services and investment or involve common external policies and the creation 
of an economic union. Our results also have implications for model-based assessments and associated 
public communication by the authorities regarding the outcome and (prospective) economic effects of 
a trade negotiation. Insofar as such assessments do not consider the moderating effect of prevailing 
regulatory regimes they may result in overestimation of net aggregate benefits and misleading 
assessments of their distribution within, and in the case of the EU, across countries. 
Regulatory cooperation or the inclusion of commitments to adopt internationally agreed and 
accepted good regulatory practices may offer one mechanism through trade agreements can become 
more relevant from the perspective of improving domestic regulatory institutions (Basedow and 
Kauffman, 2016). Some steps in this direction have been taken in a number of recent trade 
negotiations, but to date the major thrust of EU agreements has been on provisions to support human 
rights, labor standards and protection of the environment in partner countries. A greater focus on the 
interaction between regulatory regimes/economic governance and services trade policy in the design 
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of deep trade agreements could increase the likelihood and magnitude of net welfare gains form 
liberalizing trade and investment in services. 
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ANNEX 
Summary statistics 
Annex Table I.1. Summary statistics  
Variable name Mean Median SD Min Max 
Labour productivity 10.924 10.865 0.586 7.696 14.142 
    0.063 0.051 0.048 0.006 0.338 
                0.433 0.436 0.135 0.152 0.689 
                0.448 0.415 0.185 0.138 0.827 
                    0.515 0.541 0.184 0.137 0.857 
                   0.383 0.374 0.164 0.064 0.718 
             0.459 0.436 0.178 0 0.815 
                  0.34 0.3 0.209 0 0.915 
                   0.515 0.533 0.177 0.096 0.873 
            0.562 0.6 0.202 0 0.972 
          0.569 0.575 0.201 0.03 0.902 
           0.428 0.305 0.311 0.005 1 
   0.181 0 0.385 0 1 
       0.147 0 0.315 0 0.928 
            0.133 0 0.292 0 0.922 
      12.136 11.897 1.225 9.331 16.153 
 
Note: Summary statistics are computed on the estimation sample of 2840 observations used in all 
regressions. 
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Estimated marginal effects of     in interaction models with horizontal economic governance 
variables 
Annex Figure I.1. Marginal effects of     as 
function of                 
Annex Figure I.2. Marginal effects of     as 
function of                     
  
Annex Figure I.3. Marginal effects of     as 
function of                 
Annex Figure I.4. Marginal effects of     as 
function of                    
  
Note: Marginal effects are estimated based on the specifications reported in Table 4.1 for which 
the point estimate of the interaction term is statistically significant. 
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Estimated marginal effects of     in interaction models with sector-specific regulatory governance 
Annex Figure I.5. Marginal effects of     as 
function of             
Annex Figure I.6. Marginal effects of     as 
function of           
  
Annex Figure I.7. Marginal effects of     as 
function of            
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